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Even as the neuro-psychoanalytic field has matured, from a naturalist point of view, the
epistemological status of Freudian interpretations still remains problematic at a naturalist
point of view. As a result of the resurgence of hermeneutics, the claim has been made
that psychoanalysis is an extension of folk psychology. For these “extensionists,” asking
psychoanalysis to prove its interpretations would be as absurd as demanding the proofs
of the scientific accuracy of folk psychology. I propose to show how Dennett’s theory of
the intentional stance allows us to defend an extensionist position while sparing us certain
hermeneutic difficulties. In conclusion, I will consider how Shevrin et al. (1996) experiments
could turn extensionist conceptual considerations into experimentally testable issues.
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INTRODUCTION
In spite of the recent data that neuropsychoanalysis has brought
forward in favor of some aspects of the Freudian theory (Armin-
jon, 2011), the status of interpretations in psychoanalysis, their
accuracy and scientific vindication, remains problematic. Grün-
baum’s (1984, 1986) critique of Freud’s tally argument, calling
for extra-clinical proofs, still governs the shape of the debate.
Nonetheless, a few decades ago we began to witness a renewed
interest in commonsense or folk psychology. Several theorists in
the field saw it as a means to pursue the hermeneutics defense
of the autonomous scientific status of psychoanalysis. In a broad
outline, the rationale consists of claiming that no one would deny
the accuracy of our daily folk psychological explanations of our
own and others’ mental states. We spontaneously attribute rea-
sons to them to causally explain their behaviors and mental states.
In the same vein, psychoanalysis could be nothing more than
an extension of folk psychology. In which case, asking to prove
how accurate psychoanalytic interpretation would be as absurd
as asking people to give proofs of the scientific reliability of folk
psychology.
My aim here consists in specifying to what extent we can
conceptually say that psychoanalysis is an extension of folk psy-
chology. To reach that goal, I will try to uncover the way in
which the hermeneutic reading of psychoanalysis put the debate
in terms of a defense of the distinction between causes and
reasons in an effort to free psychoanalysis from the burden
of having to prove itself. After having considered Grünbaum’s
main arguments against this position, and especially against the
hermeneutic reading that would be acausal, I will show how
extensionism referred to folk psychology in order to return Grün-
baum’s rationale against his own arguments. I will defend the
claim that both Grünbaum’s and the extensionists’ positions are
misleading. I will do so by referring to Dennett’s intentional
stance, since it provides a theory of interpretation that allows
determining in what extent folk psychology can be scientifically
used. From a naturalist1point of view, I will generally defend
the idea that the intentional stance thus can be said to be a
causal-hermeneutics. On this basis, I will lastly expose how the
seminal experiments performed by Shevrin et al. (1996) may
allow turning these conceptual considerations into a testable
issue.
THE HERMENEUTICIZED FREUD
In the twentieth century, hermeneutics2 emancipated itself from
its exclusive location in the field of biblical exegesis and became
the designation for the general study of the theory and practice
of interpretation. Dilthey posited hermeneutics as the salient epis-
temic boundary that divided the method of the natural science
explaining phenomena in terms of blind natural causes and the
Humanities, which give us an understanding of human actions
by reconstituting their inner reasons throughout an empathic
process. The latter would determine the scientifically acceptable
way it would be possible to experiment in the fields of history,
sociology, or psychology.
In line with the hermeneutics tradition, modern hermeneuts
(Jasper, Ricoeur, Habermas. . .) considered psychoanalysis, con-
tra experimental psychology, as the interpretative science par
excellence. To Ricoeur (1970), for instance, There is no observa-
tional fact in psychoanalysis, only interpretations! If experimental
psychology gives the causes of actions, thus misses their inten-
tional or motivational dimension, psychoanalysis gives a “deep”
understanding of their reasons. The causes and reasons distinc-
tion would firstly vindicate psychoanalysis as an autonomous
1The kind of naturalism that I endorse here posits that any kind of phenomena is
underpinned by natural causes and has to be explained in reference to the best sci-
ence we have at our disposal. Such a position does not imply eliminative materialism,
i.e., that intentional phenomena would play no role in scientific inquiries.
2The term hermeneutics comes from the Greek Hermeneuein that means explaining,
interpreting, translating.
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science. Secondly, it would justify Ricoeur’s claim that attempting
to ground psychoanalysis on a natural science basis is a priori
useless, not to say an epistemological nonsense! As a matter of
fact, the hermeneutical tradition is tied with the idea that the
interpretation of a text, an action, a thought, etc., depends on the
encounter between an interpreter and a text, a historical event
or an action. Interpretation is not the literal reconstruction of a
genuine intention, but the attempt to make an intention compre-
hensible at the light of the interpreter’s historical and idiosyncratic
expectancies. In other words, an interpretation is a never-ending
negotiation process intervening between the interpreter and the
interpretans’ situated perspectives, as a “fusion of their horizons,”
as Gadamer (1997) would put it. In a sense, hermeneutics is in line
with the Quine (1960) inscrutability of the interpretation’s refer-
ent. No deep or hidden meaning would constitute an objective fact
that would foreclose on any further conflict of interpretation. Thus
several interpretations, even contradictory ones, might relevantly
and practically account for the same texts, actions, etc.
The French psychoanalyst Viderman (1970) applied the
hermeneutical program and the indeterminacy of the interpre-
tation at its heart to the difficulties inherent to Freudian interpre-
tations. Indeed, most of the Freudian interpretations are not only
determined by the “psychic material” provided by patients, but
also by Freud’s modification of the patients’ narrative, by which
Viderman meant the inversions or inventions of meanings that
Freud introduced. If this is so, why then would Freud claim that he
was only reconstructing objective causes of symptoms? To Vider-
man, Freud’s position would have been more warranted if he had
claimed that psychoanalysis was simply about constructing heal-
ing fictions or narratives. If nothing really counts as an objective
fact of interpretation, then the final analyst’s interpretation “does
not have reconstructed a historical scene, but builds a hypotheti-
cal scene, perfectly consistent, where historical elements constitute
magnetizing points that yield cohesion to the posterior fantasy”
(Viderman, 1970, my translation). In other words, interpretations
rightness would not be indexed on its accuracy, i.e., its capacity to
enlighten mental objective referents, yet on its curative efficacy.
GRÜNBAUM ON CAUSES, REASONS, AND INTERPRETATION
The difficulties tied with the epistemological status of interpre-
tation in psychoanalysis are at the heart of Grünbaum’s essential
critique of psychoanalysis. I propose to consider two of his argu-
ments. The first is an attack on what is, at least for Grünbaum
(1984, 1986), the sole argument Freud proposed to vindicate psy-
choanalytic interpretations. The second (Grünbaum, 1984, 1986,
2004) is a rejection of the hermeneutical distinction between
causes and reasons and its epistemological implications.
To Grünbaum Freud only provided one argument for validat-
ing interpretations. The “tally argument,” as Grünbaum names it,
consists in claiming that «[Patient’s] Conflicts will only be success-
fully solved and his resistances overcome if the anticipatory ideas
he is given [the psychoanalytic interpretation] tally with what is
real in him»(Freud, 1963).
Grünbaum (1984, 1986) convincingly shows that a curative
effect can only be validated in comparison to group controls. Thus,
in the absence of such extra-clinical data, to impute the therapeu-
tic effects to the psychoanalytic interpretation is no more accurate
than to impute it to suggestion, spontaneous remission, or placebo.
To prove the validity of the psychoanalytic cure, Freud would have
to have submitted it to the kind of comparisons between group
controls, as it is usually required in medicine.
As we can see, the hermeneutic reading of psychoanalysis
attempts to immunize psychoanalysis against this kind of attack. In
Grünbaum’s terms, in defending the causes-reasons distinctions,
hermeneutics has tried “(a) to free the study of human ideation
from the evidential burdens of the standards empirical sciences
and (b) to draw an ontological boundary line between mental and
other natural processes so as to strengthen the case for (a)” (Grün-
baum, 2004). Thus, the causes-reasons distinction is revealed as
nothing more than a strategy to make the extra-clinical argument,
as a necessary condition for validating an interpretation, to be
a priori absurd.
Thus, the second of Grünbaum’s (1984, 1986) attacks to which
I here refer to consists in pointing out acausality as an invali-
dating limit to the hermeneutic reading of Freud’s theory. Grün-
baum’s reasoning implies three arguments: (1) the principles of
hermeneutic interpretations make a non-technical use of the con-
cept of cause and reason, especially in reducing causality to physics
events. (2) Adopting the physicalist myth might lead us to consider
reasons as distinct from causes whereas the practical syllogism and
the liberal definition of causality, yield the criteria of the causal
properties of reasons. (3) On this basis, the hermeneutic advocates
wrongly claim that Freud’s explanations determine not physical
causes but mental reasons, whereas in reality Freud’s explana-
tions simply do not meet the elementary criteria of the practical
syllogism. Grünbaum’s argument for the causal relevancy of the
practical syllogism to the question of causality goes like this:
The relation of causal relevance between an antecedent X and
an outcome Y:
X may be a physical, mental, or psychophysical cause if it makes
a difference to the occurrence of Y and affect the incidence of Y.
Explications in terms of reasons are normally in conformity
with the practical syllogism:
X carries out an action Z because he desires to achieve a goal Y,
and also believes that doing Z will achieve Y. Thus the desire-
cum-belief set supplies “the reason” for doing Z. But psychoan-
alytic explanations do not conform to this model; they fail, in
other words, to justify themselves with reference to the practical
syllogism.
“Unconscious motives do not constitute such “reasons,” because
classical psychoanalytic explanations typically do not event con-
form to the practical syllogism. It turns out that the explanatory
motives do not include an unconscious belief that the explained
behavior is a means of realizing the repressed aim. Therefore, such
behavior fails to be a species of intend action, although the impulse
that instigates it can be said to be a repressed aim or “intention”
(Grünbaum, 1986).
To sum up, then, the supporters of hermeneutics, by refusing,
a priori, to reduce interpretation to explanation within the nat-
uralistic framework, do offer the advantage of highlighting the
heuristic nature of the psychoanalytic interpretative framework.
As such, they are constructing the premise of the theory that would
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identify psychoanalysis with an extension of folk psychology. But
as far as this epistemological distinction is fruitful in leading to
clarifying the composite nature of psychoanalysis’s causally irre-
ducible discourses, identifying it with a Dilthey-like set of under-
standings, rather than physical causes, it also, necessarily, leads to
Grünbaum’s accusation of acausality (acausal-hermeneutics). If
interpretations are not causally linked, by one means or another,
to a causal process, how could they elicit any positive effects on
the ego, not to say on the brain? And if no fact of any kind yields
any constrains or validation of the interpretative course, a reason
justified inquiry is bound to fall to relativism, the impossibility to
weigh reasons one against the other or, in other words, relativism.
Before analyzing the relevance of Grünbaum’s arguments
against the cause-reasons distinction, I propose to expose how
extensionists paradoxically adopted the latter, in order to defend
the autonomy of psychoanalysis. In other words, I want to show
how they cleverly accept Grünbaum’s statement on the causal sta-
tus of reasons and turn it against him in order to rehabilitate
the hermeneutics’ defense of the epistemological autonomy of
psychoanalysis.
THE EXTENSIONIST RESPONSE
What I am calling extensionism is defined as the theory according
to which psychoanalysis would be an extension of folk psychology.
To understand it, we can refer to Thomas Nagel’s (1994) classic
justification of it. Nagel interprets Freud’s philosophy of mind to
consist in a threefold claim: (1) that conscious mental states are
physical states of the brain: (2) nevertheless, that some other states
are analogous to conscious ones, i.e., they induce the same psycho-
logical effects, but are unconscious, and thus we can apply to them
the psychological terms or intentional idiom we use for conscious
states: and (3) consequently, the problem of psychoanalysis does
not concern the ontological nature of “unconscious mental state3,”
but turns on an epistemic question: what is the utility of such an
extension of folk psychology? And, on top of it, what evidence
supports it?
Given that we define folk psychology by reference to the way
people spontaneously understand, explain, and predict other’s
behaviors and mental states on the basis of beliefs and desires
attributions, then it is evident from psychoanalytic terminology
that we are still engaged, here, with an extended folk psychology.
What does the term“extension”means here? To Edelson (1988), for
instance, psychoanalysis does not extend folk psychology concep-
tually, e.g., bringing out new propositional attitudes for instance.
The point is that most of the psychoanalytic concepts such as
unconscious, primary processes, repression, ambivalence, etc., are
commonly taken to refer to psychological mechanisms, while at a
clinical level, they represent the tools allowing to literally extend-
ing the range of processes that are explainable by the means of folk
psychology.
Extensionism can be seen as a mid-position between the
hermeneutics defense of psychoanalysis’ scientific autonomy and
Grünbaum’s realist conception of the causal status of the practi-
cal syllogism. As a matter of fact, if ascribing reasons is a sort of
3On the recent debates on whether it is conceptually possible for a representation
to be unconscious, see Searle (1992) and Smith (2004).
assignment of causes, i.e., if they describe the mental states that
really determine one’s behavior, then Hopkins (1988) remark has
a lot of force: “. . . why controls should be required for psychoan-
alytic but not common sense judgments on the role of motives. If
commonsense cogency as to causal relevance is in question, then
surely, it seems, commonsense practices (or their extension) might
suffice for it.”
Indeed, nobody would require scientific validation for the men-
tal ascriptions of ordinary life. If we are really set on denying the
causal relevancy of the reasons we ascribe, then not only Freudian
interpretations, but also all our mind readings attempts become
groundless. As a consequence, the justification of interpretations
would not rest on empirical facts but would be a matter of “holis-
tic coherence4.” Since “commonsense reasoning [. . .] suits the
psychological properties of persons, which are rarely uniformly
repeated but always pervasively and non-coincidentally related in
content” (Hopkins, 1988), an interpretation is confirmed or dis-
confirmed in function of its capacity to appear as coherent. If it
enters into a cogent connection with the others wishes, beliefs,
actions, etc., the analyst can ascribe to the patients, the interpreta-
tion the analyst presents is accurate. The same rationale would be
applicable to the therapeutic success. If it is “part of commonsense
psychology that motives and wishes can be modified by awareness
and thought” (Hopkins, 1988), thus the therapeutic success would
take part to the holistic validation procedure of interpretations.
THE ALIQUIS FORGETTING
But what about Grünbaum’s argument according to which the
classical psychoanalytic explanations would fail at conforming to
the practical syllogism? Before showing in which extent exten-
sionism fails at overcoming the main limits of the acausal-
hermeneutics, I propose to attack Grünbaum here, since I claim
that it is possible to make psychoanalytic explanations conform to
the practical syllogism, without doing violence to the main claims
of psychoanalysis.
Consider the famous Aliquis forgetting Grünbaum’s analysis
is generally based on. In a classical case outlined in The Psy-
chopathology of everyday Life (Freud, 1965), Freud tells of having
met a young academician on a train who, in the course of the dis-
cussion, forgot one word, “aliquis,” when he tried quoting Virgil.
Freud hypothesized that something, an unconscious determinant,
had induced the forgetting. After having questioned the scholar,
Freud interprets that the word “aliquis” is very close to the word
“liquid” and then has been repressed since the scholar is afraid his
mistress might be pregnant (aliquis, liquid, period)5. According
to Grünbaum (1984), “This well-known case fails to conform to
the practical syllogism. For there is not a shred of evidence that
the male subject underwent his memory lapse in the unconscious
belief – however foolish – of thereby realizing (fulfilling) his desire
(hope) that his paramour is not pregnant.”
4Such a holistic coherence is nothing more than an alternative formulation of
the hermeneutics circle that posits that the understanding of a text as a whole is
established by reference to the individual parts and reciprocally.
5The exact words are: “Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor!” The scholar starts
dividing the word into “a” and “liquis.” To Freud, the term liquid is linked to
“exoriare” (originating) that is associatively related to “excreting” or “expelling.”
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According to him, psychoanalysis cannot yield the reasons of
symptoms taken that Freudian classic explanations do not con-
form to the practical syllogism (X desires to do Y, and believes
that Z achieves Y, thus X does Z). On that model, the aliquis case
should be described as follows: X desires his paramour not to be
pregnant, he believes that if he forgets her putative pregnancy, she
won’t be pregnant, so he forgets her pregnancy or any word asso-
ciatively linked to pregnancy. To Grünbaum, such a syllogism is
invalid. The first reason why would be that the belief is logically
“foolish.” And he is right, what an irrational belief it would be to
think that if you forget something it will make it disappear! Here
are the paradoxes of self-deception: how could one think to forget
something without thinking of it? But this is precisely the kind
of egregious irrationality Freud wanted to explain. Secondly, the
explanatory motives would not, according to Grünbaum, include
an unconscious belief that the behavior to be explained is a means
of realizing the repressed aim. Let’s apply it to the aliquis case.
The Freudian concept of “compromise formation” is precisely
the kind of notion that allows extending mental ascriptions. It
posits that a symptom can be said to be the by-product of an inner
conflict that partly expresses the warring tendencies of that con-
flict. If so, the forgetting of the word aliquis can be divided into two
independent desire-cum-belief expressions, which both conform
to the practical syllogism. On the one hand, the scholar desires
to be responsible and believes that taking his mistress’s putative
pregnancy seriously will allow him to cope with it. So he does so.
On the other side, he desires not to be effected by bad news, and
believes that avoiding thinking that his mistress is pregnant will
preserve him from bad feelings, so he avoids any hint that would
lead him to think of his mistress’ putative pregnancy.
Consequently, the forgetting may have two partial reasons, one
tending to repress unpleasant thoughts, the other one tending to
occupy the scholar’s attention. In a sense, the forgetting is the
means by which the repressed aim is realized, and the fact that
the scholar is conscious of his incapacity to recover the quote
he is supposed to know by heart, is the way the other inten-
tion partly succeeds too. The problem with Grünbaum’s analysis
consists in making the forgetting the illogical consequence of the
desire-cum-belief conjunction, instead of considering the conflict
as inducing a disturbance of thoughts that are decoupled from the
conflict. Whatever Grünbaum thinks, this is clearly the conclusion
Freud (1965) is driven to when considering the aliquis forget-
ting as induced by “the disturbance of a thought by an internal
contradiction which arises from the repressed.”
THE WEAKNESS OF EXTENSIONISM AND VIRTUES OF
HERMENEUTICS
As we can see it, whatever “foolish,” there are always “special sto-
ries” allowing reconstructing the reasons of weird actions, lapses,
symptoms, etc. But even if it is right, in adopting the realist con-
ception of folk psychology, to restore psychoanalysis’ autonomy
and its independence from any kind of extra-clinical data, exten-
sionits end up falling in the hermeneutical trap; psychoanalysis is
still acausal if it fails to give us the extra-clinical proof that would
allow it to avoid plunging into relativism.
In postulating the explicative autonomy of folk psychology and
then claiming psychoanalysis is an extension of it, extensionists
expect that psychoanalysis is secured, as folk psychology is, from
being subject to controlled testing. But nothing, except an unques-
tioned but problematic matching, explains how folk psychological
ascriptions match the psychological properties of persons. This is
precisely the kind of question that the advocates of hermeneutics
put to realism in their defense of the cause-reason dichotomy. But
it is also the kind of miraculous matching eliminativists – those
who denied any accuracy to folk psychology – refute. Indeed, the
realist conception of folk psychology endorsed by Grünbaum, and
thus by the extensionists, is hardly sustainable either under a first
or a third-person perspective. Let’s consider some problems.
Firstly, since Wittgenstein, it is common to say that reasons
can only be alleged by the agent. Whatever true or false, only the
agent is able to articulate its action according to his beliefs and
desires, otherwise he could not recognize himself as the subject
of its own action. The realist conception of reasons mostly rests
on the assumption that subjects must enjoy here a privilege of
infallibility and exclusiveness in accessing their reasons to act. The
point is that such infallibility is performative, not epistemic. Sev-
eral experimental studies on the sense of agency – the way we
come to think we are agents who intentionally plan, realize, and
control our actions – have shown that subjects, in specific cir-
cumstances, will misattribute to themselves action they did not
intended (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999). If these experiments do
not definitely exclude the people sometimes act for reasons, they
nevertheless challenge the folk psychological judgment accord-
ing to which our sense of agency must be immune to error. On
this basis several scholars have claimed, against the kind of realis-
tic position Grünbaum endorses, that reasons are not causal but
ex post facto narrative rationalizations or confabulations regard-
ing actions, better than the real mechanisms that cause actions
(Gazzaniga, 1985).
Thus, even if we do admit that the description of actions that
conform to the practical syllogism are driven by reasons, there
is nothing, at least from a first-person perspective, that pleads in
favor of its causal status. As we will see, even from a third-person
perspective, many intentional like behaviors are retrospectively
explainable in terms of reasons, even if we know perfectly well that
there are no internal psychological mechanisms such as reason in
them.
Secondly, when Grünbaum (1984) rejects what he calls the
hermeneutist’s non-technical use of the concept of cause, he acts
as if the status of mental causation was not a philosophical issue.
Yet, taking for granted the causal status of reason leads to pretend-
ing that the mind-body problem or that psychophysics causation
is non-problematic. Borrowing from Kim (1989), we may say that
physics is closed and complete (closure principle), i.e., each event
is caused by a precedent causal physical event and nothing imma-
terial can have any causal efficacy. Thus, if a mental state M is said
to be causal, to a materialist, it must be realized by a physical base
P. Now imagine that M causes a physical event P′, we must suppose
that it has been caused by an antecedent physical event too, in this
case P, that is the physical base of M. If we claim that P’ has two
causes, it is said to be overdetermined. But according to the closure
of physics, P is sufficient for P’ to occur. Thus, claiming that M is
causal is superfluous or indicates the breakdown of Kim’s claim
about physics, and the re-validation of dualism.
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Consequently, Grünbaum (1984, 2004) might be right claim-
ing that X is a cause if it makes a difference to the occurrence
of Y. But does X, as a mental property, makes a difference in the
occurrence of Y because of its physical basis or independently of it?
To maintain his position, Grünbaum has to explain how a mental
event can make a difference in the occurrence of Y without being
instantiated on a physical basis and/or to what extent the mental
“property” is not causally superfluous, i.e., what it metaphysically
means that it can take part in the whole causal process determin-
ing a physical event. Of course Grünbaum’s assimilation of causes
and reasons does present the advantage of being, as he puts it,
applicable “alike in medicine, psychology, physics, sociology, and
elsewhere” (Grünbaum, 2004). But where the mental properties
are relevant, as in psychology, sociology and, sometime, in med-
icine, what proof is there that what is supposed to be mentally
relevant here is not reducible to the underlying neurobiological,
biological, and in fine, physical properties, that instantiate them?
Instead of facing those difficulties, Grünbaum’s position consists
in acting as if the causal status of mental processes were unprob-
lematic and as if it would have received a well-accepted definitive
solution. In other words, his liberal notion of the concepts of
causes and reasons could be right, and it might turn out that
physicalism is a fallacy, but without detailing what makes mental
properties, and thus reasons, causally relevant, Grünbaum’s posi-
tion appears as too indeterminate to seriously put physicalism in
doubt.
Note that in claiming that Grünbaum and thus extentionists
fail to motivate their causes-reasons identification, I do not dis-
miss the former’s general conclusion concerning hermeneutics’
incapacity to test its interpretations. Interpretations, to be scien-
tifically acceptable, must be founded on facts, whatever they might
be. Thus, what we have to deal with consists in addressing whether
we can articulate the specificities of the hermeneutics theory of
interpretation within the physicalist’s ontology. To do this, we have
to define in what extent causal properties can determine facts of
interpretation. That is precisely what the intentional stance theory
(IS), by Dennett, will allow us to do.
IS PSYCHOLOGY IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER?
We defined folk psychology as the way people spontaneously
understand, explain, and predict other’s behaviors and mental
states on the basis of beliefs and desires attributions. To real-
ists, such as Grünbaum or the extensionists, these ascribed mental
states refer to causal states in the persons. To eliminativists (for
instance Churchland, 1981), folk psychological entities are non-
existent. Nevertheless, some of the latter group, as Rorty (1988)
for instance, acknowledge that folk psychology constitutes a con-
ceptual schema, one among others, which only represents a nor-
mative framework collectively used to explain or evaluate others’
behaviors. Thus, folk psychology would not exist elsewhere than
in the “eye of the beholders” and, consequently, would have no
ontological nor explicative superiority to astrology, magical think-
ing, homeopathy, etc., except as being more widespread as an
interpretative schema.
Mentioning Rorty’s position on folk psychology represents a
good angle for introducing the IS that can be positioned at a
midpoint between eliminativism and commonsense realism about
mental states. If Rorty were right, there would be no way of distin-
guishing how folk psychology allows explaining others’ behaviors
better than astrology. But we have means to show that the first
works at predicting behaviors, while we have no such evidence
in favor of the latter. Furthermore, the fact that intentional states
might be observer-relative does not prevent folk psychology, at
least not a priori, from referring to objective states, the nature of
which we shall have to define. How can we show that it does refer
to objective states that, in spite of their being in the eye of the
beholder, make folk psychology testable, as compared to others
interpretation schemas?
As Dennett (1981) proposes, imagine Martians landing on
earth, who are able to predict humans’ future behaviors from the
current physical states of the world and of their bodies (brains).
Even if such a performance were epistemologically and technically
possible, Martians, as Dennett puts it, would overlook the behav-
ioral regularities humans successfully rely on to easily explain and
predict others’ behaviors. Predictability is the core concept here.
To emphasize its role, Dennett (1983) invites us to remember A
scandal in Bohemia. In the Arthur Conan Doyle novel, Sherlock
Holmes must find out a precious photography the well-identified
blackmailer has hidden in a room. Holmes’ ploy simply rests on
a conditional version of the practical syllogism that departs from
the realist one:
- If the blackmailer desires to hide the compromising picture in a
safe place.
- If he believes that, in the event of danger, removing the picture
might increase the chances of preserving it.
- Then, in the event of danger, the blackmailer will remove it in a
safer place.
The trap goes like this: Watson throws a smoke bomb in the house
shouting fire. Holmes, hidden in the room, observes the black-
mailer collecting the photograph and, consequently, revealing the
hiding place.
According to Dennett, the intentional states’ referential status
is a matter of fact. When Holmes predicts someone else’s behavior
on the basis of attributions of beliefs and desires, his use of the
folk psychology reveals the existence of objective behavioral reg-
ularities or patterns. The point is (1) that the objectivity of these
patterns is retrospectively confirmed if, and only if, the predic-
tion is successful; and (2) that the intentional states postulated are
not causal or objective per se, but represent heuristics that make
it possible to grasp these objective regularities. This second point
is closely related to Rorty’s critics of the relativist nature of folk
psychology, which otherwise appeared to be the dead end that
doomed hermeneutics. Remember Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999)
theory of color perception. It is false to say that colors exist neither
as ontological properties in the world, nor in the mind as sub-
jective states. Colors are “interactional properties,” testifying that
the way human beholders, with their specific perceptive capaci-
ties, grasp objective physical regularities (wavelengths). In other
words, humans live in an intentional Umwelt. Interactional prop-
erties such as colors or propositional attitudes need competent
perceivers and causal properties in order to be said to be objective.
Thus, reasons are real properties, such as colors are real. But they
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are not real in the same sense we can say that physical entities, such
as wavelengths for instance, are real; The latters do not need to be
observed to exist.
REASONS, CAUSES AND REAL PATTERNS
Let’s consider two implications for physicalism related to the IS.
According to eliminativism, we can imagine that a mature psy-
chology will eradicate folk psychology. Neuroscience might be,
someday, in measure to provide a mature psychology able to
explain and predict behaviors more accurately. Elimininativists
bet on such a theoretically possible future that would allow cre-
ating a propositional-attitude-free theory on the basis of which
behaviors could be explained and predicted. In doing so, they pre-
suppose the physicalist Laplacian dogma (logical determinism): if
we could know all the laws of the universe, including the laws of
the brain, then, we could predict others’ behaviors from the cur-
rent physical state of the world. The fact is that, even before asking
whether it is conceptually possible – and always answered with the
irrefutable “in-principle-if-not-in-practice” mantra – we have to
acknowledge that current neuroscience does not dispose of such
knowledge, nor of the calculating powers it might necessitate. The
point is that folk psychology, at least in comparison with what
neuroscience and physics can currently predict, is still the most
reliable and easy way to explain and predict intentional actions in
everyday life. But does this mean that folk psychology can claim a
quasi-scientific status autonomously, i.e., without reference to the
causal phenomena neuroscience and physics deal with?
The IS does not invalidate physicalism (i.e., that physical ontol-
ogy and natural causality underlie phenomena, including mental
ones), but disputes only the claim that physics would be the only
level at which one could successfully predict behaviors. Consider
the following example: when bees die (Dennett, 1983), their con-
geners remove their dead bodies from the hive. A naïve observer
or a realist such as Grünbaum, might observe the scene and suc-
cessfully proposes to put apiary behavior into the mold of the
practical syllogism, according to which the desire-cum-belief can
be identified as the reason of an action Grünbaum: bees desire
to avoid diseases, and they believe putrid bodies to be the vehicle
of diseases, and thus they remove dead bodies from the hive. The
descriptive practical syllogism can be turned into a conditional
or predictive one, which will prove resistant to falsification. Then,
the intentional competent observer has brought to light an objec-
tive pattern or behavioral regularity, which has been confirmed by
recurrent facts.
But a “kill-joy” explanation has in fact shown that bees’ behav-
ior can be more economically explained as a tropism. Dead bees
secrete oleic acid. As it turns out, any object impregnated with oleic
acid, including live bees, is removed from the hive. Recall Dretske’s
teleosemantic theory (Dretske, 1988). The presence of a moving
black spot triggers the frog’s reflex of tongue-catching. Even if the
neural mechanism plays a functional role – it triggers the fly catch-
ing reflex devoted to survival purposes – the internal cerebral state
does not indicate the fly per se, but instead a black spot moving
(Lettvin et al., 1959). The bee’s oleic blind detector plays the same
function. The point is that the psychological description – the bee
representation about dead bees, the desire to keep healthy, etc. – is
quite false. There is nothing like propositional attitudes in it, not
even an isomorphic pattern in the brain (Fodor’s mentalese, for
instance), yet only blind detectors triggering motor procedures. In
other words, the ascribed reasons – the desire-cum-belief – works,
even if it is false. But it works not because reasons are causal per se,
but because it captures objective behavioral regularities, causally
determined by inner blind regulation traits. Consequently, Grün-
baum can claim that the desire-cum-belief X makes a difference in
the occurrence of the bee’s behavior Y. But the desire-cum-belief
is here wrongly identified as the causal factor.
In sum, the IS emphasizes the objectivity of the processes cap-
tured by folk psychology, provided that the predictions that it
generates are successful. This conclusion does not contradict the
fact that the patterns are in the eye of the beholder, nor with the
faulty interpretations it might give. Thus, if it challenges the pre-
dictive pretentions of the reductive programs of neuroscience and
physicalism (at least their current pretentions), the IS theory has
in common with the latter the assumption according to which
psychological states rest on blind (non-intentional) mechanisms.
Thus, while eliminativism calls for folk psychology to be aban-
doned because of it inaccuracy or its falsity, the intentional stance
is richer, specifying how folk psychology, in spite of its defects, can
be said to be a scientific tool. It is if it enables heuristic explana-
tions that are empirically testable in the light of publicly observable
behaviors.
This point has to be emphasized contra the relativism that
weakens the hermeneutics as well as the extensionist approaches.
As a matter of fact, people in their daily life are successful in using
folk psychology. But if such successes do not necessitate to be scien-
tifically evaluated in daily life, what allows saying these behavioral
regularities are objective, rests on the fact that if such predic-
tions are really successful, they must be, in principle, “testable by
standard empirical methods of variable manipulation” (Dennett,
1991). We will see that extensionists are precisely missing their
point in eluding the necessity to undergo scientific procedure in
order to validate reasons ascriptions.
FACTS OF INTERPRETATION OR NEURO-HERMENEUTICS
The IS can be said to be a hermeneutics that, as a consequence
of the inscrutability of the reference, opens a room or allows that
several interpretations might be good candidates for explaining
the same behavior, be it that they refer to different interpretative
schemas (psychoanalysis, astrologer, etc.) or to different psychoan-
alysts. Note that even if one can easily identify the reasons that may
motivate simple actions, as in the paradigmatic case of the bees
that remove dead bee bodies, the more the behaviors are complex,
the more the primary reasons are hard to isolate. This is precisely
what psychoanalysis makes evident. The kind of irrational states
psychoanalysis deals with necessitate building up special stories
with multiple and sometime contradicting reasons. What makes
the IS interesting is that it does not matter if we can multiply
the interpretations if we can count on a good pragmatic criteria
allowing us to select the relevant ones. Thus, while the acausal-
hermeneutics uses the causes-reasons distinction as a justification
for the understanding’s epistemic autonomy toward explanation,
the IS constructs a causal-hermeneutics, since reasons are articu-
lable and evaluable in reference to the causal factors that underlie
them. Both the inner causal features and the measurable behaviors
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represent, therefore, the kind of interpretation facts one can lean
on to validate the heuristic value of a reason ascriptions.
Let’s emphasize the heuristic role of interpretation in discover-
ing the inner causal features (such as the oleic acid detector) that
determinate the behavior. As Dennett puts it:
“It is not that we attribute (or should attribute) beliefs and
desires only to things in which we find internal representa-
tions, but rather that when we discover some object for which
the intentional strategy works, we endeavor to interpret some
of its internal states or processes as internal representation.
What makes some internal feature of a thing a representation
could only be its role in regulating the behavior of an internal
system” (Dennett, 1981).
The last part of the quote is important here. In the causal-
hermeneutical understanding of the IS, intentional attributions
are not only evaluable in the light of the successful behavioral pre-
dictions it is possible to infer from them. The IS implies that if a
mental state indicates an internal regulating feature, any accurate
interpretations ought to be correlated to a regulating causal feature
too.
Let’s transpose this to neuroscience and to psychoanalysis (not
to say to neuropsychoanalysis). Neuroimaging techniques are now
appropriate for testing these kinds of alternative predictions. We
can expect that subjects’ brains might be sensitive or might get
active when presented with stimuli linked to their putative ascribed
reasons. Such a possibility would be even more plausible if the kind
of ascribed reasons are such as to refer to intentional ascriptions
the subject would ignore, such as the unconscious mental states
psychoanalysis claims to be able to discover thanks to its inter-
pretation schema. Consider the following experiment by Shevrin
et al. (1996).
Shevrin et al. (1996) conducted an experiment with subjects
suffering from neurosis. On the basis of a couple of tape-recorded
interviews, clinicians constructed a list of affect-laden words
which, according to the Freudian theory, were supposed to refer
to the patients’ unconscious conflicts6. It was counterbalanced
by another list the words of which were chosen by the patients
in reference to their subjective (conscious) apprehension of the
constituents of their inner conflicts7. A third list of universal
affect-laden words constituted a control condition.
The three lists were presented to patients in two different
conditions, subliminally and supraliminally, while the subject’s
ERPs (evoked-response potential) were recorded. The results
6Some might claim that this kind of interpretation does not take into account the
dialogic or interpersonal nature of interpretation. The analysant’s states of mind is
not what has to be “discovered.” In line with the hermeneutic tradition, the interpre-
tation should rather be conceived of as emerging from the relational interpretative
process. I totally agree. But this does not forbid the psychoanalyst to provide an
interpretation as if it was third-person knowledge, abstracted from the relation, and
that would take the patient’s psychic determinants as the object of the psychoanalytic
inquiry.
7To give an example, if the “aliquis” scholar had participated to this experiment, the
terms “liquid” or “period” should have been part of the analysts’ list. As the scholar
attributed his lapse to fatigue, “tiredness” could have been added to his own list. For
a comprehensive description of the experiment, including the clinical details, see
Shevrin et al. (1996).
show different patterns of responses triggered by subliminal and
supraliminal exposure. On a one hand, the words chosen by
the analysts, presented subliminally, triggered a specific time-
frequency pattern: the highest frequency has the shortest latency.
The reverse was true for the patient’s words presented sublimi-
nally. In the supraliminal condition, the words chose by the analyst
and that had the lowest frequency now had the shortest latency,
while the reverse was true for the patient’s words. In others words,
the results suggest that the two kinds of words were associated
and processed differently in comparison to the control condition
where the subliminal-supraliminal presentations did not displayed
inverse patterns.
What can be inferred from this? We could expect that if the
“psychoanalytic stance,” as we will call this version of the IS for
the moment, were not efficient at capturing internal features or
neural patterns, it would have never induced patients’ brain spe-
cific reactions in comparison to control words choose randomly.
Of course, the fact that these neural features are triggered does not
imply that the unconscious reasons provided by the psychoana-
lysts are the real cognitive or unconscious mental determinants
of the patients’ neuroses. But these words were chosen within the
strict limits of an interpretative schema. Moreover, they were not
chosen with the patients – who thus were not aware of them as
mental determinants – and were not perceived consciously in the
subliminal condition. In other words, they are pure interpretative
material. Thus, if we take for granted that the experiment’s pro-
tocol suffers from no methodological deficits, we could predict
that if the interpretations were not relevant, it would have never
triggered specific neural patterns. In other words, in line with
the causal-hermeneutical framework – in this case we can talk
about neuro-hermeneutics – we can claim that if the key words,
related to reason ascriptions, do trigger neural patterns, we do pos-
sess, contra Grünbaum, a retrospective validation of their heuristic
value.
CONCLUSION
Let’s go back to the initial question: is psychoanalysis an exten-
sion of folk psychology? I will give two answers. Psychoanalysis
surely is an extension of the folk psychology range of applica-
tion. But the term “extension” cannot be invoked as a means to
defend psychoanalysis’ autonomy, taken that it fails at overcom-
ing the problems it was supposed to solve: relativism, acausality,
absence of proof. In a sense, I propose here to transform the initial
question into these terms: is the intentional stance an extension of
folk psychology? As a matter of fact, the IS is a theory that speci-
fies the scientifically credible use of folk psychology as a heuristic
tool, and the kind of criteria that allow us to evaluate its accuracy
in certain given instances. As a scientific extension of folk psy-
chology, it comes more than what is required to the daily life folk
psychological ascriptions. If the folk psychology does reveal objec-
tive patterns, the latter have to be, in principle, testable by standard
empirical methods of variable manipulation. Thus if psychoanaly-
sis is an extension of folk psychology, “extension,” here, has to be
understood in a stronger sense than the extensionist’s use of the
term: as a specific use of the intentional stance, psychoanalysis
must be a scientific extension of folk psychology. Thus, in line
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with Grünbaum it must accept the tests of scientific criteria, e.g.,
variable manipulation, statistics, EEG, groups control, etc8.
The problem is that extensionists often write as though psy-
choanalysis has no scientific pretentions and is nothing more
than a naïve use of folk psychology. But Folk psychology can-
not be in the same time what has to be proved to be accurate
and what is convoked as a control of what is accurate. This
is precisely one consequence of the non-equivalency of causes
and reasons. If reasons are essential as heuristic ascriptions and
do reveal something about the regularities underlying behaviors,
they are not causal per se; instead, only the behavioral regu-
larities and the inner regulation features it indicates are causal.
These can at least be accounted as facts of interpretation. In
decoupling reasons and causes, the IS allows rehabilitating the
interpretation theory provided by hermeneutics, yet overcomes
its deficiencies. In other words, the IS can be qualified as a
causal-hermeneutics.
Lastly, Shevrin et al.’s (1996) seminal experiment can be seen as
a brilliant example of how psychoanalysis might become, among
the plethora of interpretative schemas, a promising hybrid tech-
nique devoted to enlightening interpretative facts. For instance,
if classical cognitive science consists in investigating univer-
sal cognitive mechanisms in manipulating universally intelligi-
ble stimuli, Shevrin’s experiments open an avenue for study-
ing universal cognitive patterns by the means of idiosyncratic
ones. In others words, it uses the IS to catch the objective
bases of “idiosyncratic biases.” Another important point is that
8One of the reviewers relevantly pointed out that Grünbaum’s validation criteria,
and thus mine, are only appropriate in the limits of the positivist framework he
adopts. There would be no reason, except a “positivist” bias, to privilege objec-
tive facts better than the interpretation internal consistency. Hermeneutics would
not be committed to relativism, taken that the interpretative process is always con-
strained by contextual guides (Stern, 2012). It is true that my naturalist commitment
implies verificationism, i.e., that experimentation only should allow overcoming the
hermeneutics limitations? But my claim is not that hermeneutics runs the risk of
relativism. On the contrary, the bee example shows that the plurality of ascribed rea-
sons is constitutive of the interpretative process and that the latter is embedded in
the context (interpersonal, social, historical, etc.). Nevertheless, interpretative plu-
rality does not imply that there are no interpretative facts. My goal is not to report
hermeneutics relativist risks, but rather its acausalitity.
Shevrin’s causal-hermeneutics, that I defined more precisely as
a neuro-hermeneutics, is not possible without taking seriously a
scientifically exploitable contrast between first-person and third-
person perspectives. In a way, then, neuro-hermeneutics might
represent a novelty within the tool-box of neuroscience, especially
in social cognition research.
But the most important implication of this experiment con-
cerns the kind of answer we can give to the initial question:
is psychoanalysis an extension of folk psychology? The point
is that, on a one hand, Dennett shows to what extent there
are facts of interpretation that can be credibly evaluated, com-
pared, selected, and rejected. On the other hand, Shevrin’s exper-
iment, in spite of its defects, shows how we can really turn
the interpretation issues into testable ones. Why am I includ-
ing the caveat, “in spite of its defects”? Indeed, if the experi-
ment provides evidence that we can, adopting a third-person
perspective, ascribe accurate unconscious reasons, under no cir-
cumstances does it give us any proof that the psychoanalytic
stance is required in order for these neural regularities to be
detected. To prove that, the neural effects imputed to the ana-
lysts’ list should not only be compared to arbitrarily chosen
affect-laden words, but to alternative lists. For instance, Shevrin
should have compared the list a psychoanalyst would have elicited,
in reference to a patient, to the one that another psychoana-
lyst would have constituted, to the one given by a cognitive-
behaviorist psychologist, an astrologer, a Chinese physician, an
ordinary person. . . Why an ordinary man? Because this is the
emblematic competent folk psychologist. If the difference between
what I called the weak and the strong versions of extensionism
is well founded, the folk psychologist’s and the psychoanalyst’s
lists should trigger different neural patterns. On this basis, we can
imagine many others controls allowing neuropsychoanalysts giv-
ing a fine-grained and experimentally motivated, answer to the
initial issue.
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